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Abstract
In Pantsar (2014), an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory
of arithmetic is presented. According to that theory, arithmetical knowledge is
based on biological primitives but in the resulting empirical context develops
an essentially a priori character. Such contextual a priori theory of arithmetical
knowledge can explain two of the three characteristics that are usually associated
with mathematical knowledge: that it appears to be a priori and objective. In
this paper it is argued that it can also explain the third one: why arithmetical
knowledge appears to be necessary. A Kripkean analysis of necessity is used as
an example to show that a proper analysis of the relevant possible worlds can
explain arithmetical necessity in a suﬃciently strong form.
1 Introduction
At ﬁrst sight, arithmetical truths appear to have two characteristics that an
epistemological theory should be able to explain: they seem to be both objective
and necessary. Whether or not this is the case under deeper philosophical
analysis, it can hardly be denied that the impression is strong. Although there
are obviously exceptions, generally mathematicians, philosophers and laymen
all ﬁnd it hard to believe that, say, 2 + 1 = 3 is merely some contract we have
agreed upon. They may disagree on what numbers are, or what it means for a
truth to be objective, but in some relevant sense they nevertheless regard 2 + 1
= 3 as an objective truth about numbers. But if it indeed is an objective truth,
it would also seem to be a necessary truth. If someone is not ready to accept
that 2 + 1 = 3 is merely a convention, she is not likely to accept that it could
have been the case that 2 + 1 = 3 was not true.
In addition to those two impressions, it is common to have the impression
that arithmetical knowledge is a priori.1 It could be said that these three char-
1It is not possible here to enter the discussion of what - if anything - constitutes a priori
knowledge. In this paper, I will accept the possibility of a priori knowledge and follow the
classical understanding that it is knowledge that can be gained in an essentially non-empirical
manner.
1
acteristics form the traditional Kantian (1781) understanding of the nature of
arithmetical knowledge.2 While this understanding is widely accepted, it has
also been challenged from many directions. Conventionalists like Wittgenstein
(1956), for example, deny the objectivity of arithmetical truths, while empiri-
cists like Kitcher (1983) reject the a priori nature.
However, there is something potentially troubling in such challenges if they
simply reject the impressions that we should be able to explain. The ﬁctionalist
Field (1980), for example, argues that the strong impression we have of the
truth of certain mathematical theories is mistaken:
What makes the mathematical theories we accept better than these
alternatives to them is not that they are true [...] but rather that
they are more useful. [...] Thus mathematics is in a sense empiri-
cal but only in the rather Pickwickian sense that it is an empirical
question as to which mathematical theory is useful. (Field (1980),
p. 15. Italics in the original)
But surely we cannot be satisﬁed to simply leave the matter there. In an account
like Field's, the usefulness of some mathematical theories over their alternatives
would seem to be one of the key philosophical questions. And just like we must
ask why certain theories are useful while others are not, we must ask why the
traditional image of arithmetic has been so appealing to mathematicians and
philosophers - as well as other scientists and laymen. What is it about arith-
metic that makes so many see it as an a priori pursuit of objective and necessary
truths? Certainly the reason does not seem to be lack of knowledge about arith-
metic, since so many experts subscribe to that view. In philosophy we may argue
that arithmetic is neither a priori, objective nor necessary, but even in rejecting
all those characteristics we cannot escape the question why it intuitively seems
to us to have these characteristics. Ultimately, any epistemological theory of
arithmetic should be able to deal with this problem.
In this paper I will study these questions with regard to the contextual a
priori theory of epistemology arithmetic proposed in Pantsar (2014). In that
account, arithmetical knowledge is thought to be empirically constrained by
biological primitives that we have as infants and share with many animals.
However, in that empirical context arithmetic is thought to be essentially a
priori. I will ﬁrst show that the appearances of a priori and objectiveness follow
directly from that theory. The situation is more diﬃcult, however, when it comes
to necessity. Since suﬃciently developed biological organisms do not develop in
all possible worlds, the conception of necessary truths as being true in all possible
worlds seems like a bad ﬁt with the contextual a priori account. I will argue,
however, that by limiting ourselves to the relevant set of possible worlds - i.e.,
ones with suﬃciently developed organisms - we get a strong enough conception
of necessity. I will argue that this is consistent with a Kripke-esque theory of
2For Kant, there was of course also the important distinction between synthetic and an-
alytic knowledge. In this paper that distinction, namely the possible diﬀerences between
arithmetical knowledge being analytic a priori or synthetic a priori, will not be considered.
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designation, when qualiﬁed for the relevant context of arithmetic. However, the
approach is not limited to any particular semantic theory, as it only involves
considering necessity in the proper context of arithmetic understood as an ability
arising from our cognitive architecture.
2 Contextual a priori
In Pantsar (2014), I have proposed an empirically feasible approach to the epis-
temology of arithmetic. The purpose of the paper is to study what kind of
epistemological theory is required if the recent results in neurobiology, cognitive
science and psychology are accepted as giving insight to the origins and nature
of arithmetical knowledge. Those results suggest that arithmetical knowledge is
built on biological primitives that we already possess as infants and share with
many nonhuman animals. In short, the brain is structured so that there is a
natural tendency to process observations in terms of discrete quantities. This
can be seen in subitizing, i.e. the ability to determine the quantity of objects
in one's ﬁeld of vision without counting, as well as in the capacity to estimate
quantities and keep them in the working memory.3
This primitive ability, what I call proto-arithmetic, should not be confused
with developed arithmetical thinking. The proto-arithmetical abilities quickly
lose their accuracy as the numerosities become larger, and the quantities can
be properly described as discrete only for the numerosities from one to four or
ﬁve.4 However, it is argued that this primitive ability to deal with numerosi-
ties works as the basis on which we develop our arithmetic, in a process in
which the development of language plays a key role. The central idea is that
the proto-arithmetical treatment of numerosities develops into actual arithmetic
once explicit rules and number words or symbols are introduced. In develop-
ing arithmetical ability, one key stage is understanding some form of successor
operation. The proto-arithmetical cognitive system enables understanding that
numerals one, two, three, and four refer to diﬀerent numerosities that
form a succession. In learning to count, we generalize on this process, that is,
3The empirical details and references can be found in Pantsar (2014). For an introduction
to the empirical studies, see Dehaene (2011) and Dehaene & Brannon (eds.) (2011). In the
latter, the paper by Nieder (2011) is particularly recommended as a good window to the state
of the art in the empirical research of proto-arithmetical cognition.
4Hence at the level of proto-arithmetic, it is better to talk of numerosities rather than
numbers. This distinction is too rarely made in the empirical literature. Unfortunately, it
is also common in the empirical literature to postulate needlessly strong abilities to the test
subjects. For example, in one of the most famous papers, Wynn (1992), it is shown that infants
react to unnatural numerosities in experimental settings. When they see one and one dolls
put behind a screen but only one doll when the screen is removed, they are surprised. This
was an important result and further experiments have shown the proto-arithmetical ability
involved in the process to be a particularly important one. The unnatural numerosity actually
surprises infants more than changes in the position, sizes, or even the character of the doll.
Nevertheless, when Wynn called her paper Addition and subtraction by human infants, she
seems to postulate needlessly strong ability to her test subject. The infants could simply
have the ability to hold one numerosity in their working memory and be surprised when the
observations don't match that.
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we understand that the step from three to four is no diﬀerent from the step
from four to ﬁve, etc. (Carey & Sarnecka 2006, Spelke 2011, Pantsar 2014).
The ﬁnal step of this development is formal arithmetic, which has tradition-
ally been the subject of philosophy of arithmetic. But to understand arithmetic
only as dealing with formal systems seems needlessly limiting, especially epis-
temologically. A key feature of my account is to see arithmetical knowledge as
a subject involving diﬀerent levels of ability with numerosities. Only then, he
claims, can we fully understand the nature of arithmetical knowledge.
Thus characterized, arithmetical knowledge has minimal ontological and
epistemological requirements. No mind-independent existence of arithmetical
objects is assumed and no special epistemic faculty for arithmetical knowledge
is needed - but neither is either of those denied. My main claim is that such a
development from the proto-arithmetical ability based on biological primitives
to the language-based arithmetical thinking is enough to explain the nature of
arithmetical knowledge - including the impression we have of it as being a priori,
objective and necessary.
In my outline for an epistemological theory for arithmetic, I characterize
arithmetical knowledge thus understood as contextually a priori. The main idea
behind that characterization is that arithmetical knowledge is indeed essentially
a priori in character, but only in a context set by empirical facts. We do not
accept the statement 2 + 1 = 3 because it can be derived from a set of
arithmetical axioms which are knowable a priori, or because we have a special
non-sensory arithmetical intuition. We accept it initially because by the time
we have learned the necessary number words or symbols, we already have a vast
experience of processing observations in terms of quantities. Our brain structure
forces upon us the notion that one object added to two objects make three
objects. From the point of view of a child learning about addition, she initially
accepts 2 + 1 = 3 because it counts as an empirical fact - it corresponds to
how she has experienced the world all her life.
However, after this empirical context is set, arithmetic does not work like
empirical sciences. It has its own methodology of proof procedures (both formal
and informal) that does not rely on empirical corroboration. While the roots
of arithmetic are in empirical aspects, in that empirical context arithmetical
knowledge is essentially a priori.5
It is important to note that in the contextual a priori account, the empir-
5My epistemological theory is related to, but diﬀerent from, other accounts emphasizing the
empirical foundations of arithmetic, e.g. Kitcher (1983), Lakoﬀ & Núñez (2000) and Jenkins
(2008). In all the accounts perhaps the key question is how we can combine the position
that arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded with the the image of arithmetic as an
a priori pursuit. The solutions range from rejecting the apriority (Kitcher) to accepting that
arithmetical knowledge is essentially both empirical and a priori (Jenkins). One key feature
of my account is to soften the notion of a priori applicable to arithmetic. However, it should
be noted that the account of contextual a priori is fundamentally diﬀerent from the ones by
Kuhn (1993) and Putnam (1976). For me, arithmetic is not simply a paradigm that is a priori
in one context but could be overthrown when that context changes. Rather, arithmetical
knowledge is based on biological primitives and as such it is based on an eﬀectively inevitable
way of experiencing the world.
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ical aspects do not play a merely enabling role for arithmetical knowledge. It
is universally accepted that empirical methods, like manipulating collections
of pebbles, help us learn arithmetic. But Frege (1884) famously distinguished
those psychological processes (the context of discovery) from what makes arith-
metical propositions true (the context of justiﬁcation). In the beginning of
Begriﬀsschrift (1879) he presents this distinction:
we can inquire, on the one hand, how we have gradually arrived at
a given proposition and, on the other, how it is ﬁnally to be most
securely grounded. The ﬁrst question may have to be answered
diﬀerently for diﬀerent persons; the second is more deﬁnite, and the
answer to it is connected with the inner nature of the proposition
considered.
When arguing that arithmetical knowledge is based on empirical aspects, am I
mixing up the two contexts? Clearly this is not the case. While I take empirical
aspects to be at the basis of arithmetical knowledge, there is an obvious diﬀer-
ence in how an indiviual arrives at a given proposition (the discovery) and what
the content of that proposition is. In studying the empirical roots or arithmetic,
I am concerned with the inner nature of the proposition - I only claim that this
inner nature cannot be fully explained in philosophy without tracking it back
to its cognitive roots.
In the contextual a priori account, when we establish arithmetical truths,
we do not engage in an empirical pursuit. The justiﬁcation comes, just as for
Frege, from an essentially a priori process. The contextual a priori account does
not make arithmetic an empirical science that allows psychological processes to
take over logical analysis as the justiﬁcation of arithmetical statements. For all
practical intents and purposes, arithmetic in the contextual a priori account is
the same a priori discipline as it was for Frege.
The diﬀerence comes when we consider why arithmetical truths are what
they are. This has traditionally been perhaps the most important question in
the philosophy of mathematics and the answers have ranged from a Platonic
world of mathematical objects to mathematics being an empirical science. The
contextual a priori account is one answer to that question. It states that arith-
metical truths are ultimately constrained by the proto-arithmetical structure of
our observations, determined by our cognitive architecture. It is that context
that gives us the conception that there are such things as discrete quantities
and they form a succession, and it is in that context that we justify arithmetical
truths with logical methods.
Thus characterized, the contextual a priori account gives a direct explanation
for one of the three impressions we have about arithmetical knowledge: that it
is a priori in character. Once the empirical context is set - which happens early
on in our lives - arithmetic is essentially a priori.
In addition to apriority, the account also gives a satisfactory explanation for
the apparent objectivity of arithmetical truths. If arithmetic is based in such a
way on biological primitives, arithmetical knowledge is based on an eﬀectively
inevitable way of experiencing the world. I argue that this gives arithmetical
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knowledge a suﬃciently strong form of objectivity. We cannot help experiencing
the world in terms of quantities, and this tendency is the basis of arithmetic.
Perhaps we would like to call this maximal intersubjectivity rather than objec-
tivity, but the important point is that arithmetical knowledge does not succumb
to the conventionalist threat. Arithmetical truths - unlike, say, the rules of chess
- are not only a matter of commonly agreed contract, and as such, we would
expect them to appear objective to us.
In this way, the account for arithmetical knowledge in Pantsar (2014) seems
to be able to explain two of the three main characteristics of the traditional im-
age of arithmetical knowledge. Although arithmetical knowledge is not strictly
a priori, it is contextually so. Moreover, this context is set by biological primi-
tives, which explains why arithmetical truths appear to be objective to us. For
someone dealing with arithmetic - from simple calculations to proving theorems
- it is quite understandable to get the image she is engaging in a priori pursuit
of objective truths. For all practical purposes, she is doing just that - in a con-
text that she is thoroughly familiar with from years of experience in processing
observations in terms of numerosities.
3 Necessity
While objectivity and the a priori appearance of arithmetic seem be to explained
in suﬃciently strong forms in the contextual a priori account, it is not clear
that the impression that arithmetical knowledge is necessary can be explained
as easily. In the tradition of analytic philosophy, a priori and necessary truths
have often been thought to amount to the same thing, that is, they are grounded
only in the meaning of the terms involved.6 Clearly such a connection picks out
an important class of sentences, those of the type all bachelors are unmarried.7
But I have argued that arithmetical statements do not belong to that class,
that is, they are not strictly a priori. In the traditional account of conﬂating a
priori and necessary knowledge, it would seem to follow that arithmetical truths
cannot be necessary, either.
When discussing modal concepts, arithmetical statements like 2 + 1 = 3
are often given as standard examples of necessary truths - that is how obvi-
ous the necessity of arithmetical truths is generally taken to be in philosophy.
But if we understand necessary truths - as is usually done since Kripke (1963)
and Lewis (1970), among others - as true in all possible worlds, arithmetical
truths according to the contextual a priori account would not be necessary.
There are possible worlds in which human beings and other animals with proto-
arithmetical ability did not develop. If arithmetical truths are based on the
proto-arithmetical ability, it would appear to follow that they are not true in
6Kripke (1980, p. 35) states that in contemporary (meaning around the year 1970) discus-
sion very few philosophers even made the Kantian distinction between a priori and necessary.
7Here I am ignoring what I see as trivial empirical elements, like the fact that we need to
see or hear (or feel) an explanation of the words involved in order to see the truth of sentences
like all bachelors are unmarried.
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such possible worlds. That is a quite troubling prospect. Most of us would not
be ready to accept that 2 + 1 = 3 could be false, yet that would seem to be
a possibility if we accept the contextual a priori account.
Are there ways out of this problem? One potential solution could be to
think of arithmetical knowledge as arising from the proto-arithmetical ability,
but arithmetical statements being true regardless of there being agents with
knowledge of them. This way we could avoid, for example, the uncomfortable
position that 2 + 1 = 3 could cease to be an arithmetical truth if there no
longer were suﬃciently developed biological organisms. But what would be the
ontological status of arithmetical truths in such a scenario? Any answer would
seem to come worryingly close to platonism or some other position that takes
arithmetical truths to be totally mind-independent, which puts the whole point
of the contextual a priori theory in question. One of the main strengths of
the theory is its lack of ontologically problematic assumptions, in particular
that of a mind-independent reality of mathematical objects. While certainly
not contradictory with the contextual a priori, assuming a mind-independent
existence of arithmetical truths at the very least goes against the general spirit
of the theory.
Another possibility could be to accept that 2 + 1 = 3 may not be a truth
in all possible worlds, but insist that this does not imply that it could be false.
It could be the case that even primitive forms of arithmetic never emerged -
perhaps because no suﬃciently developed biological organisms developed - but
if it did, it would have been the case that 2 + 1 = 3 is true. In such a
scenario, either 2 + 1 = 3 is true, or there are no arithmetical truths. But
also this solution seems to make an ontological claim that is too strong for
the general spirit of the contextual a priori theory. According to the theory,
arithmetic is based on our cognitive architecture. But it is possible that the
brain structure could evolve in a suﬃciently diﬀerent manner to give birth to
a radically diﬀerent kind of arithmetic. To think that arithmetical knowledge
must develop among the lines it has in our actual world suggests a stronger
ontological status for arithmetic - that arithmetical truths somehow determine
the way biological organisms must develop.
4 What are arithmetical truths?
Based on the considerations above, explaining the apparent necessity of arith-
metical truths appears to be a diﬃcult task for the contextual a priori theory.
The main obstacle seems to be combining an account that takes arithmetical
knowledge to be based on biological primitives with the position that arith-
metical truths must be true also in possible worlds where no such biological
organisms exist. The big question is, however, how much weight we should give
to such possible worlds. What if we instead limited our focus only to possible
worlds with suﬃciently developed biological organisms?8
8By suﬃciently developed, I mean suﬃciently developed along the lines that evolution
took in our actual world. I do not wish to engage here in speculation about highly developed
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Such a move may sound unwarranted, but I claim that it is because in
philosophy we are still too committed to the traditional conception of arithmetic
as a priori necessary truths. We use 2 + 1 = 3 as an example of a necessary
truth because it is thought to give a prime example of a statement that is true
regardless of the characteristics that possible worlds may have. But inherent in
that is a strong form of objectivism about arithmetical truths. It may be easy to
accept, for example, the position that arithmetical truths are eternal. However,
it is not as easy to give that position a satisfactory explanation without evoking
strong ontological commitments.
Perhaps we need to have a platonist conception that arithmetical truths
concern mind-independent mathematical objects, which is hardly a satisfactory
explanation for the contextual a priori theory. Alternatively, we may believe
that arithmetical truths are actually logical truths. Yablo (2002) has argued
for the position that arithmetic arises from our cognitive mechanisms, but that
arithmetical facts are actually facts of ﬁrst-order logic. Since logical truths are
commonly accepted as really being necessary, this explains why arithmetical
truths appear to be necessary.
However, it is not obvious how moving the focus to logic adds explanatory
value. First of all, while we certainly can present ﬁnite quantiﬁer-free arithmeti-
cal truths like 2 + 1 = 3 as truths of ﬁrst-order logic, there is no generally
accepted way of deriving full arithmetic purely from logic.9 But even if we could
derive full arithmetic from logic, would it explain anything further? Yablo ar-
gues that logical truths are indeed necessary since they are tautologies. It is
not clear, however, why logical truths should be somehow easier to accept as
necessary than arithmetical truths. Indeed, the necessity of 1 + 1 = 2 seems to
be just as obvious as that of logical tautologies. Yablo explains this by claiming
that arithmetical truths are in fact logical truths, and thus equally necessary.
An alternative explanation would be that both simple arithmetical and simple
logical truths are enforced upon us by our cognitive architecture, thus making
both contextually a priori in character. Without further arguments, it is hard
to see how we can distinguish between the apparently diﬀerent natures of logical
and arithmetical truths.
One such further argument has come fromMaddy (2014), who also holds that
simple arithmetical statements are shorthand for logical truths. Her account
diﬀers from Yablo's in that she allows that we need something more for the
... part in the progression of natural numbers, i.e. when moving from ﬁnite
numbers to the inﬁnity of them. For this, she argues - following Bloom (2000)
- that:
Much as our primitive cognitive architecture, designed to detect [the
logical structure of the world], produces our ﬁrm conviction in sim-
biological organisms with completely diﬀerent cognitive systems.
9The neo-Fregeanism of Wright (1983) comes perhaps closest to fulﬁlling the logicist idea
but in addition to using second-order logic, which is sometimes seen as going against the
logicist ideal, he uses a non-logical axiom - the so-called Hume's principle - in deriving the
axioms of arithmetic. Yablo's own solution is to interpret universal quantiﬁers in arithmetic
as inﬁnite chains of conjunctions.
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ple cases of rudimentary logic, our human language-learning device
produces a comparably unwavering conﬁdence in this potentially in-
ﬁnite pattern. (Maddy 2014, p. 234)
Thus Maddy's theory is similar to the contextually a priori account when it
comes the move beyond the primitive origins. However, when it comes to those
primitive origins, her account has two diﬀerences. First of all, she holds that
the cognitive architecture is about logical structure, i.e. it is proto-logical rather
than proto-arithmetical. At this point, it is impossible to commit strongly to
either position based on the empirical data. However, for the present matter at
hand, it seems irrelevant whether our primitive abilities are primarily logical or
arithmetical - or perhaps equally both. If they shape our experiences and thus
constrain the content of arithmetic, the contextual a priori is equally applicable
to both explanations.
The second diﬀerence is more relevant. In the above quotation, Maddy
writes that our primitive cognitive architecture detects the logical structure of
the world. In the contextual a priori account, the cognitive abilities are only
thought to categorize our observations in terms of numerosities. This is clearly
an important diﬀerence, since for Maddy rudimentary arithmetic (arithmetic
without the ... part) comes from the structure of the world, thus proposing
stronger objectivism than the contextual a priori account.
This comes down to a version of the old Kantian problem of distinguish-
ing between objective features of the world and those imposed by our cognitive
architecture. Are we designed to detect the logical structure of the world or
does our cognitive architecture impose that structure on our observations? Un-
fortunately, here I cannot go deeper into such considerations. But ontological
carefulness being at the heart of the contextual a priori project, I am not pre-
pared to accept Maddy's strong objectivist claim. In any case, her position is in
no way incompatible with the contextual a priori account. Perhaps arithmetic is
ultimately about objective features of the world and as such arithmetical truths
are mind-independent and necessary in a stronger sense. What I am arguing
for here is that even without making that assumption - for which I do not see
enough grounds - we can have a perfectly satisfactory account of the apparent
necessity of arithmetical truths.
This is an important point, because it seems that augmenting the contex-
tual a priori theory of arithmetical knowledge with a strong form of objectivism
would take away power from my argumentation. Even if the theory were es-
sentially correct, we would now need to ask how the biological primitives are
connected to either the platonic world of mathematical objects or the logical
structure that all possible worlds share - which are just the kind of problems
that the contextual a priori account was supposed to avoid.
5 Necessary contextual a priori knowledge
It seems to be the case, however, that the reason arithmetical truths are such
popular examples of necessary truths is not simply because they appear to be
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true in all possible worlds. Instead, I claim that that impression is based on
another impression: that arithmetical truths are a priori. If we can ﬁnd out a
truth simply by reﬂection, it is easy to accept that the truth in question holds
in all possible worlds. But of course I argue that we do not ﬁnd out arithmetical
truths purely a priori. Consequently, we should also be prepared to reconsider
our understanding of arithmetical necessity.
In modern analytic philosophy it is widely accepted that Kripke in his Nam-
ing and Necessity (1980) demolished the old notion that only a priori knowledge
can be necessary. Most importantly, he argued that there are cases of neces-
sary a posteriori knowledge. The best-known example of this is the sentence
Hesperus is Phosphorus. Both Hesperus and Phosphorus are proper names
and as such pick out the same thing in every possible world where that thing
exists. For Hesperus, the thing is the evening star, and for Phosphorus, the
morning star. But we know that Hesperus and Phosphorus actually refer to
the same thing, the planet Venus. So the sentence Hesperus is Phosphorus is
necessarily true: in all possible worlds Hesperus and Phosphorus refer to the
same thing. Since the fact that both refer to the planet Venus was discovered
empirically, Kripke argues, Hesperus is Phosphorus is a case of necessary a
posteriori knowledge.
Could we use Kripke's strategy above to save the necessity of arithmetical
knowledge in the contextual a priori account? At ﬁrst sight, the argument looks
promising, since the concept of necessity is expanded beyond strictly a priori
truths - which arithmetical truths are not, according to my account. The key
point in Kripke's argument, however, is by no means guaranteed to apply to the
case at hand. Kripke introduced the term rigid designator for terms that pick
the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists. In this he
relied on a causal theory of reference. We can know that the term Hesperus
picks out the evening star in every possible world where the evening star exists
because there is causal link from the name Hesperus to the event of giving it
its reference, the planet Venus.
But in the case of arithmetical knowledge, is there a causal link between,
say, the numeral two and its reference? Can we think of numerals as rigid
designators? Kripke himself was notoriously reluctant to discuss the ﬁner details
(e.g., the nonexistence of objects) of rigid designation. Among the distinctions
he explicitly ignored was that of de jure rigidity and de facto rigidity (Kripke
1980, p. 21 n. 21). De jure rigidity is designation by stipulation, like in the
case of Hesperus and Phosphorus, whereas de facto rigidity can be designation
by description. In Kripke's example, the smallest prime is a de facto rigid
designator because it picks out a unique object, the number two.
De facto rigid designation would seem to open up interesting possibilities.
Let us continue with the contextual a priori account and deny that arithmetical
knowledge comes from some kind of direct access to mind-independent natural
numbers. In that case, whether or not there are such things as natural numbers,
there could hardly be de jure designation for numerals. However, it appears
that also in this case descriptions like the smallest prime do designate rigidly.
Whenever we do have natural numbers, the smallest prime picks out the same
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number.
When it comes to natural numbers, the question of existence is obviously
more tricky than with the planet Venus. The whole point of approaches like
Pantsar (2014) is that we do not need to evoke mind-independent existence for
numbers in order to have feasible epistemology of arithmetic. But at the same
time, the theory is based on biological primitives and as such entails a high level
of objectivity for arithmetical truths. There may not be such an object as the
natural number two, but there is extremely strong objectivity in the way we use
the numeral two.10
However, it seems that the latter type of objectivity is enough for a Kripke-
type theory of reference. 2 + 1 = 3 is true in all possible worlds where enough
arithmetical or proto-arithmetical ability has developed to give reference for
the numerals 2, 1 and 3. It is not necessary that there is a single object,
the natural number two, to which we refer to when we use the numeral two.
Rather, two can designate diﬀerent things at diﬀerent levels. When a child
ﬁrst learns to use the numeral two correctly, her understanding of arithmetic is
very limited and the numeral refers to her proto-arithmetical knowledge arising
from seeing (or hearing or touching) two things.
When arithmetic develops beyond this primitive level, we ﬁnd explicit ways
of characterizing what two refers to, for example, by using the successor op-
eration twice on zero. When we refer to a number like eleven, in which case
our proto-arithmetical ability no longer suﬃces, we refer to using the successor
operator on zero eleven times. That is how we learn to count and do basic
arithmetic as children. When we use the numeral two in this more developed
context, we are referring to something conceptually diﬀerent from what the child
does with her proto-arithmetical use of two.
At a ﬁrst glance, it would then seem obvious then that two cannot be a
rigid designator in either the de jure or the de facto sense, as it can refer to
diﬀerent things. However, this is not so simple. It is clear that if we do not
include arithmetical objects in our ontology, in the strict sense numerals cannot
be rigid designators. But while in the contextual a priori account numbers are
not postulated to exist, numerals are still thought to refer to something strongly
objective, i.e., the concepts developed in arithmetic which are constrained by our
biological structure. There is no single object that the numeral two designates,
but it still manages to pick out something that is at the basis of animal and infant
behaviour, as well as of our developed arithmetic. If arithmetic is constrained
by biological primitives in a strong way as argued in the contextual a priori
account, the numeral two picks out that something in all possible worlds where
suﬃciently developed biological organisms develop.
This is not quite the rigid designation of Kripke, but it is essentially similar
- as long as we turn the focus on cognitive abilities instead of objects. Rather
than talk about all the worlds where the object exists, we focus on all the
10It should be noted that Kripke also introduces (1980, p. 28) the term strong rigid
designation for terms referring to necessary existents, presumably including numbers. It is
unclear to me whether there are conceivable cases of strong rigid designation, but it should
be clear by now that natural numbers should not be considered to be such.
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worlds where suﬃciently developed biological organisms develop. Rather than
talk about a single object, we focus on an ability with quantities that has a
continuous development from the proto-arithmetical ability to developed formal
arithmetic. With these adjustments, the use of the numeral two has essentially
the same characteristic as Kripke's rigid designation: namely, it picks out the
same thing in all the possible worlds where that thing exists.
What that thing is in case of arithmetic, however, is more complicated
than in the case of Venus. At the stage of our development when we understand
abstract objects, we can conveniently refer to the abstract natural number two.
That is why the numeral two appears to be a rigid designator. However, un-
der further analysis it is revealed that two refers to something much more
complicated, a development which has diﬀerent stages starting from the proto-
arithmetical origins and ending up with formal axiomatic arithmetic. But im-
portantly, that development is constrained by our cognitive architecture and
thus guarantees a strong form of objectivity for the reference of two. While
this is not Kripke's rigid designation, it is rigid enough for our current purposes
- explaining the apparent necessity of arithmetical knowledge.
Whatever the exact philosophical characteristics of natural numbers may be,
our shared biological structure and the arithmetical knowledge built on that will
make sure that the numeral eleven will pick out the same object from what
we at the furthest stage of the development describe as the abstract domain
of arithmetic, the set of natural numbers. But there is no need to postulate
that such a set or its elements actually exist. Perhaps they do, but we can also
explain arithmetical knowledge and the reference of numerals without evoking
such platonic properties.
There are, of course, possible worlds in which arithmetic did not develop.
But in Kripke's theory it is enough that the name picks out the same thing in all
the possible worlds where the thing exists. When we adjust our understanding
of arithmetical objects as above, a Kripke-like theory ﬁts well with my theory
of contextual a priori epistemology of arithmetic. It is enough that a numeral
picks out the same thing in all the possible worlds where suﬃciently developed
biological organisms develop.
Kripke argued that knowledge can be necessary and a posteriori. If that is
the case, it follows that arithmetical knowledge can be both necessary and con-
textually a priori. I hope to have shown that in a modiﬁed Kripkean framework
we can explain at least the apparent necessity of arithmetical truths. Perhaps
arithmetical truths are necessary also in the strong sense of Kripke, i.e. true in
all possible worlds. The contextual a priori account does not take a stand on
that question. But it can explain why arithmetical truths are true in all pos-
sible worlds with suﬃciently developed biological organisms. For the purposes
of this paper, that is enough. We have explained, based on the contextual a
priori account of the epistemology of arithmetic, the last of the three apparent
characteristics that arithmetical knowledge has. In addition to appearing to be
both a priori and objective, it has now been shown why arithmetical knowledge
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appears to be necessary.11
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